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NAVIGATING THE TURBULENCE: THE 
FIRST CIRCUIT CLARIFIES THE 
PREEMPTIVE SCOPE OF THE AIRLINE 
DEREGULATION ACT IN BROWN v. UNITED 
AIRLINES 
Abstract: On July 9, 2013, in Brown v. United Airlines, Inc., the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the Airline Deregulation Act 
(“ADA”) preempted skycaps’ common law tortious interference and unjust 
enrichment claims. In so holding, the First Circuit articulated a two-pronged 
test in an attempt to provide clarity to the relationship between the savings 
clause and the preemption clause of the ADA. This Comment argues that the 
First Circuit’s two-pronged test is faithful to U.S. Supreme Court jurispru-
dence and should serve as a model for other federal appeals courts until the 
Supreme Court provides additional guidance. 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2008, two separate putative class actions were brought against US 
Airways and United Airlines on behalf of skycaps,1 alleging common law 
claims of unjust enrichment and tortious interference.2 The skycaps alleged 
that the implementation of new two-dollar bag fee policies by both airlines 
dramatically reduced their earnings.3 Both airlines contended that the Air-
line Deregulation Act (“ADA”) of 1978 preempted the skycaps’ claims.4 
The preemption clause in the ADA prohibits a state from enacting or enforc-
ing a law, regulation, or other provision having the full force and effect of 
law if it is related to the price, route, or service of an air carrier.5 After con-
solidating the two cases as to the issue of ADA preemption, the U.S. District 
                                                                                                                           
 1 Brown v. United Airlines, Inc. (Brown II), 720 F.3d 60, 62 (1st Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 
82 U.S.L.W. 3242 (U.S. Oct. 7, 2013) (No. 13-444). “Skycaps” is a term of art used to describe 
porters who provide curbside service at airports. Id. 
 2 Mitchell v. US Airways, Inc., 858 F. Supp. 2d 137, 140–41 (D. Mass. 2012), aff’d sub nom. 
Brown II, 729 F.3d 60; Brown v. United Air Lines, Inc. (Brown I), 656 F. Supp. 2d 244, 247 (D. 
Mass. 2009). 
 3 Mitchell, 858 F. Supp. 2d at 140; Brown I, 656 F. Supp. 2d at 247. The skycaps further al-
leged that the airlines intentionally and improperly misled passengers to think the charge was a 
mandatory tip for the skycaps. Mitchell, 858 F. Supp. 2d at 148; Brown I, 656 F. Supp. 2d at 248. 
 4 See Mitchell, 858 F. Supp. 2d at 148; Brown I, 656 F. Supp. 2d. at 249; 49 U.S.C. 
§ 141713(b)(1) (2006) (providing for the preemption of, inter alia, certain state laws and regula-
tions). 
 5 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b). 
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Court for the District of Massachusetts granted the airlines’ motions for 
summary judgment.6 On appeal, in 2013, in Brown v. United Airlines, Inc. 
(Brown II), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the ADA 
preempted the skycaps’ common law claims.7 
In reaching its decision, the First Circuit articulated a two-pronged 
analysis of the ADA’s preemption clause and its relationship to the savings 
clause of the Federal Aviation Act (“FAA”) of 1958.8 Under this two-
pronged test, the ADA preempts plaintiffs’ claims if: (1) the claims are 
based on a state law or provision, and (2) the claims are sufficiently related 
to prices, routes, or services provided by the air carrier.9 By articulating the 
two-pronged analysis in Brown II, the First Circuit set forth a clear mode of 
analysis for lower courts to follow.10 Other courts have found the ADA 
preemption clause analysis elusive, leading to disagreement in its applica-
tion.11 Specifically, the courts have differed as to how expansively the term 
“services” should be defined, resulting in an array of decisions not always 
uniform in their treatment of the ADA.12 
This Comment argues that the First Circuit’s two-pronged test devel-
oped in Brown II is faithful to U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence, provides 
clarity to the preemptive scope of the ADA, and prevents the reregulation of 
                                                                                                                           
 6 Mitchell, 858 F. Supp. 2d. at 252; see Brown II, 720 F.3d at 62. 
 7 Brown II, 720 F.3d at 66. 
 8 Id. at 63. The FAA’s savings clause allowed state laws to coexist with federal airline regula-
tion. See Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. 85-726, § 1106, 72 Stat. 731, 798 (current version 
at 49 U.S.C. § 40120(c) (2006)). The Act’s language has been modified over time, but its operative 
provisions remain in force today. See 49 U.S.C. § 40120(c). 
 9 Brown II, 720 F.3d at 63. 
 10 See id. at 62; see also Eric E. Murphy, Federal Preemption of State Law Relating to an Air 
Carrier’s Services, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1197, 1228 (2004) (arguing that a broad definition of ser-
vices, and an analysis that focuses on the connection between state action and airline services, will 
provide clarity to consumers and airlines). 
 11 See DiFiore v. Am. Airlines, Inc. (DiFiore II), 646 F.3d 81, 87, 89 (1st Cir. 2011) (noting 
that there is no easily-applied test for ADA preemption analysis); Taj Mahal Travel, Inc. v. Delta 
Airlines Inc., 164 F.3d 186, 192 (3d Cir. 1998) (explaining that federal appeals courts have strug-
gled with the relationship between the ADA and common law claims); Abdu-Brisson v. Delta 
Airlines, Inc., 128 F.3d 77, 85 (2d Cir. 1997) (noting that ADA preemption jurisprudence has left 
courts with an elusive test); Spinrad v. Comair, Inc., 825 F. Supp. 2d 397, 407 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) 
(same). 
 12 See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b) (2006); Branche v. Airtran Airways, Inc., 342 F.3d 1248, 
1257, 1264 (11th Cir. 2003) (interpreting “services” broadly, but holding that claims based on state 
whistleblower law is not preempted); Charas v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 160 F.3d 1259, 1261 
(9th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (defining “services” as generally referring to point-to-point transport of 
passengers); Hodges v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 44 F.3d 334, 336 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (holding 
that “services” includes terms such as ticketing, boarding procedures, provision of food and drink, 
and baggage handling, in addition to the transportation itself). For an examination of the discrep-
ancies in federal appeals court interpretations of “services,” see Murphy, supra note 10, at 1206–
17. 
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the airline industry through state common law.13 Part I outlines the devel-
opment of the ADA’s preemption clause and introduces the First Circuit’s 
two-pronged analysis articulated in Brown II.14 Part II examines how other 
circuit courts have interpreted the ADA’s preemption clause.15 Finally, Part 
III argues that the two-pronged analysis provides clarity for courts and the 
airline industry as to which common law claims fall under the ADA’s 
preemptive scope.16 As a result, Part III urges other federal courts to adopt 
Brown II’s two-pronged analysis when analyzing the ADA.17 
I. THE FLIGHT PATH: AIRLINE DEREGULATION AND THE FIRST CIRCUIT’S 
APPLICATION OF THE ADA TO COMMON LAW 
The ADA is part of a multi-faceted airline regulatory scheme.18 Alt-
hough the ADA amended the FAA, the FAA’s savings clause was retained.19 
Thus, the ADA’s preemptive scope turns on the interplay between the com-
peting interests of deregulating the airline industry and preserving states’ 
traditional police powers.20 At issue is how best to reconcile the broad scope 
of the ADA’s preemption clause with the savings clause retained from the 
FAA.21 These competing clauses highlight Congress’s intent to prevent 
states from replacing federal airline regulations with regulations of their 
                                                                                                                           
 13 See infra notes 84–101 and accompanying text. 
 14 See infra notes 18–63 and accompanying text. 
 15 See infra notes 64–83 and accompanying text. 
 16 See infra notes 84–101 and accompanying text. 
 17 See infra notes 84–101 and accompanying text. 
 18 Brown II, 720 F.3d at 62; see Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 
Stat. 1705 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.). 
 19 See 92 Stat. at 1705 (indicating that the FDA amends the FAA); Federal Aviation Act of 
1958, Pub. L. 85-726, § 1106, 72 Stat. 731, 798 (current version at 49 U.S.C. § 40120(c) (2006) 
(“A remedy in this part is in addition to any other remedies provided by law.”)). 
 20 See Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 222, 232–33 (1995) (holding that the sav-
ings and preemption clauses, when read together, prevent states from imposing their own airline 
regulations, while preserving states’ power to enforce private agreements); Morales v. Trans World 
Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 379, 388 (1992) (observing that it is doubtful Congress would un-
dermine the sweeping preemption clause with a general savings clause); Donald J. Frenette, 
Avoiding Preemption Under the Airline Deregulation Act, 17 MISS. C. L. REV. 171, 182 (1996) 
(arguing that courts have struggled to reconcile the inherent conflict that exists between these two 
clauses). The ADA’s preemption clause has sparked disagreement among the federal courts. Com-
pare Buck v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 476 F.3d 29, 37 (1st Cir. 2007) (holding that only self-imposed 
undertakings fall outside of the ADA preemption clause), with Charas v. Trans World Airlines, 
Inc., 160 F.3d 1259, 1264 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that all common law contract claims fall outside 
the ADA preemption). 
 21 See Frenette, supra note 20, at 182. Although the two provisions are not directly linked, 
courts have analyzed the FAA’s saving clause when determining the ADA’s preemptive scope. See, 
e.g., Wolens, 513 U.S. at 232; Brown II, 720 F.3d at 62; Charas, 160 F.3d at 1265. 
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own while also respecting traditional state police powers.22 Section A dis-
cusses the legislative history and Supreme Court interpretation of the 
preemptive scope of the ADA.23 Section B examines the First Circuit’s de-
cision in Brown II and the two-pronged analysis that the court articulated.24 
A. Congressional Deregulation of the Airline Industry 
In 1978, Congress enacted the ADA for the purpose of deregulating the 
airline industry to promote maximum reliance on market forces.25 In con-
cluding that deregulation would further the efficiency and innovation of 
airline services,26 Congress amended the FAA,27 but retained the FAA’s sav-
ings clause, which allowed state law to coexist with federal regulation.28 
Nevertheless, to prevent states from circumventing federal deregulation by 
enacting regulations of their own—the ADA included a preemption provi-
sion, prohibiting states from enforcing any law “relating to rates, routes, or 
services” of any airline.29 Under the federal preemption doctrine, this 
preemption provision nullifies any conflicting state laws.30 
                                                                                                                           
 22 See Wolens, 513 U.S. at 232. 
 23 See infra notes 25–40 and accompanying text. 
 24 See infra notes 41–63 and accompanying text. 
 25 Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705, 1705 (codified as 
amended at 49 U.S.C. § 40101(a)(6) (2006)) (“An Act . . . to encourage, develop, and attain an air 
transportation system which relies on competitive market forces . . . .”). Prior to 1978, The Federal 
Aviation Act of 1958, the foundation of air carrier regulation, gave the Civil Aeronautics Board 
(“CAB”) authority to regulate interstate affairs. See Pub. L. 85-726, § 102, 72 Stat. 731, 740, 
amended by Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.); Morales, 504 U.S. at 378. 
 26 See 49 U.S.C. § 40101(a)(6); Wolens, 513 U.S. at 232; Morales, 504 U.S. at 378. 
 27 See 92 Stat. at 1705. 
 28 Federal Aviation Act § 1106, 72 Stat. at 798 (current version at 49 U.S.C. § 40120(c) 
(2006)). Congress later abolished CAB and transferred enforcement of the remaining regulatory 
authority over the airline industry to the Department of Transportation (DOT). Civil Aeronautics 
Board Sunset Act of 1984, Pub. L. No 98-443, §§ 3–4, 98 Stat. 1703, 1703–05; Morales, 504 U.S. 
at 379 (explaining the DOT’s enforcement authority over the airline industry). For a detailed ex-
amination of the CAB and the legislative history of airline regulation, see Craig M. Fallon, Note, 
Constitutional Law—Federal Preemption—The Federal Aviation Act Does Not Preempt State 
Claim Against an Airline for Breach of Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Arising from 
Overbooking, 23 RUTGERS L.J. 427, 438 (1992). 
 29 See Federal Aviation Act § 105, 92 Stat. at 1708 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. 
§ 41713(b) (2006)); Morales, 504 U.S. at 378 (“To ensure that the States would not undo federal 
deregulation . . . , the ADA included a preemption provision.”). The language of the ADA preemp-
tion clause was later adopted without substantive change by the Federal Aviation Administration 
Authorization Act (FAAAA) of 1994, and the terms ADA and FAAAA have therefore been viewed 
as interchangeable. See Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994, Pub. L. No 
103-272, § 41713, 108 Stat 745, 1143 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 14501(b)(1) (2006)); 
see also Rowe v. N.H. Motor Transp. Ass’n, 552 U.S. 364, 370 (2008) (holding that the ADA and 
FAAAA preemption provisions are interchangeable); Deerskin Trading Post, Inc. v. United Postal 
 
2014] Brown Clarifies the Preemptive Scope of the Airline Deregulation Act 19 
Two Supreme Court cases have attempted to clarify the relationship 
between the ADA’s preemptive scope and the retained FAA savings 
clause.31 In 1992, in Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., the Court struck 
down state guidelines addressing airline advertisements, finding them in-
consistent with the ADA’s deregulatory purpose.32 In doing so, the Court 
emphasized the sweeping nature of the preemption provision, which dis-
places all state laws within its sphere.33 Additionally, the Court viewed the 
savings clause as a relic of the pre-ADA, pro-regulation regime, and there-
fore superseded by the preemption clause.34 Nevertheless, the Court clari-
fied that the ADA did not preempt state actions too tenuous, remote, or pe-
ripheral to have preemptive effect, but did not clarify which state actions 
would be too tenuously related.35 
In 1995, in American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, the Court reaffirmed the 
broad scope of the ADA’s preemption clause by striking down a state law it 
viewed as having the potential to intrude on airline business practices.36 The 
Court, however, found that the ADA did not preempt a common law breach 
of contract claim.37 In so holding, it carved out an exception to the expan-
                                                                                                                           
Serv. of Am., 972 F. Supp. 665, 669 (N.D. Ga. 1997) (“The language Congress chose in drafting 
the preemption provisions of the FAAAA shows that Congress intended for the preemption provi-
sions of the FAAAA to be applied in an identical manner as the preemption provision of the 
ADA.”). 
 30 Morales, 504 U.S. at 383. The principle of federal preemption originates from the Supremacy 
Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which states that the laws of the United States “shall be the Supreme 
Law of the Land.” See U.S. CONST. art. IV, cl. 2; Dustin M. Dow, Note, The Unambiguous Su-
premacy Clause, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1009, 1017 (2012) (stating that all preemption cases turn on the 
effect of the Supremacy Clause). The Supremacy Clause is interpreted to nullify state laws when 
they come into conflict with federal laws. See, e.g., Morales, 504 U.S. at 383; Cipollone v. Liggett 
Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 427 
(1819). Although express language streamlines potential preemption issues, the scope of the preemp-
tion may still be uncertain. See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009) (discussing the difficul-
ty of interpreting the scope of an express preemption clause). In such instances, congressional in-
tent has long been viewed as the principle resource in defining the scope and extent of an express 
preemption clause. See Morales, 504 U.S. at 379. 
 31 See Wolens, 513 U.S. at 232–33; Morales, 504 U.S. at 384–85. 
 32 504 U.S. at 391. 
 33 See id. at 383–84 (observing that the language employed by Congress, particularly the 
phrase “relating to,” illustrates the preemption clause’s broad and expansive scope). 
 34 Id. at 385 (expressing doubt that Congress intended to undermine this carefully drawn stat-
ute through a general savings clause). 
 35 See id. at 390. The Court did, however, suggest that laws related to prostitution or gambling 
are examples of stated laws too tenuously related. Id. 
 36 513 U.S. at 234 (holding that the ADA preempted the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Decep-
tive Practices Act when applied as a guideline to airlines’ marketing programs). 
 37 Id. at 228–29 (concluding that the ADA does not preempt an airline’s alleged failure to 
uphold the terms of a frequent flyer program as part of a contract it voluntarily entered into with 
passengers). 
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sive scope of the preemption provision.38 The Court reasoned that the reten-
tion of the FAA’s savings clause allowed state adjudication of routine 
breach of contract claims that do not rely on state policies external to the 
agreement.39 This “Wolens exception” protects the enforcement of self-
imposed private obligations from the ADA preemption clause.40 
B. The First Circuit’s holding and two-pronged analysis in Brown II 
The First Circuit’s 2013 decision in Brown II arose out of three differ-
ent sets of putative class actions: DiFiore v. American Airlines, Inc. 
(DiFiore II); Mitchell v. US Airways, Inc.; and Brown v. United Airlines, 
Inc. (Brown I).41 In 2006, in DiFiore v. American Airlines, Inc. (DiFiore I), 
the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts first considered 
whether the ADA substantively preempts claims connected to skycaps and 
curbside baggage fees.42 In December 2005, American Airlines and other 
national air carriers instituted a two-dollar fee for curbside check-in ser-
vice.43 In their complaint, the skycaps alleged that this new curbside check-
in fee impermissibly diminished their income, as skycaps’ compensation 
depended largely on tips.44 American Airlines moved to dismiss, claiming 
that the ADA preempted the skycaps’ claims.45 The district court granted 
summary judgment against all of the skycaps’ claims with the exception of 
their claims of violation of the Massachusetts Tip Law (the “Tip Law”) and 
tortious interference.46 
The Tip Law and tortious interference claims were tried in the District 
of Massachusetts in the spring of 2008, resulting in a jury verdict in favor of 
                                                                                                                           
 38 See id.; see also Buck, 476 F.3d at 34 (explaining that Wolens carved out an exception for 
parties seeking recovery solely on an airline’s breach of its own, self-imposed undertakings). This 
exception has been referred to as the “Wolens exception.” See Buck, 476 F.3d at 34; Brown II, 720 
F.3d at 70. 
 39 See Wolens, 513 U.S. at 232–33 (noting that the enforcement of private agreements that 
airlines voluntarily enter into is too tenuously connected to significantly affect an airline’s prices 
or services). 
 40 Buck, 476 F.3d at 34; see Wolens, 513 U.S. at 232–33. 
 41 Cf. Brown II, 720 F.3d. at 61, 64 (discussing Mitchell and Brown I and holding that DiFiore 
II resulted in the common claims of the consolidated putative class actions to be preempted by the 
ADA). See generally DiFiore II, 646 F.3d 81; Mitchell, 858 F. Supp. 2d 137; Brown I, 656 F. 
Supp. 2d 244. 
 42 688 F. Supp. 2d 17, 17 (D. Mass. 2009), rev’d, 646 F.3d 81. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. The skycaps alleged that customers perceived the new fee as a mandatory gratuity, and 
therefore, the charge amounted to diverting tip revenue from employees. See id. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. at 25. The court reasoned that the Tip Law affected airlines in their capacity as employ-
ers, not as air carriers, and that the law thus has too peripheral a connection to be preempted. Id. at 
23; see MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 152A (2004). 
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the skycaps on both theories.47 American Airlines appealed, and in 2011, in 
DiFiore II, the First Circuit reversed the district court ruling, holding that 
the ADA preempted the Massachusetts Tip Law.48 The court did not reach 
the question of whether the ADA preempted the tortious interference claim 
because it found the claim rested critically on the Massachusetts Tip Law 
and was thus rejected.49 
While the First Circuit considered DiFiore II, similar putative class ac-
tions challenging other major airlines’ curbside check-in charges were filed 
on behalf of skycaps in the Massachusetts Federal District Court.50 In 2008, 
in Mitchell, and in 2009, in Brown I, skycaps asserted several Massachusetts 
statutory and common law claims against the airlines.51 After the First Cir-
cuit’s ruling in DiFiore II, both classes conceded that the ADA preempted 
their state law claims; nevertheless, citing the Supreme Court’s Wolens de-
cision, the classes contended that their common law claims of unjust en-
richment and tortious interference fell outside the ADA’s broad preemptive 
scope.52 The District of Massachusetts consolidated Mitchell and Brown I 
and granted both airlines’ motions for summary judgment, reasoning that 
these common law claims would have the same prohibitive effect in appli-
cation as the Massachusetts Tip Law.53 The district court determined that 
the Wolens exception is limited to the enforcement of contracts and there-
fore could not be applied to the skycaps’ unjust enrichment claim, which is 
an equitable remedy that would enforce external state policies.54 
On appeal, the First Circuit articulated a two-pronged analysis to de-
termine whether the ADA preempted the skycaps’ common law claims.55 
The first prong focuses on the procedural relevance of the claim to deter-
mine whether the claim is based on a state law, regulation, or other provi-
sion that has the force and effect of law.56 The second prong then focuses on 
                                                                                                                           
 47 DiFiore I, 688 F. Supp. 2d at 18. 
 48 646 F.3d at 87, 89. 
 49 Id. at 89. 
 50 Mitchell, 858 F. Supp. 2d at 140, 145; Brown I, 656 F. Supp. 2d at 247. 
 51 Mitchell, 858 F. Supp. 2d at 140, 145; Brown I, 656 F. Supp. 2d at 247. Note that although 
commenced in 2008, Mitchell was decided in 2012, after consolidation with Brown I. See Mitch-
ell, 858 F. Supp. 2d at 162. 
 52 Mitchell, 858 F. Supp. 2d at 154–55, 158 (illustrating the arguments posed by the parties 
pursuant to their consolidated action); see also Wolens, 513 U.S. 232–33 (holding that the ADA’s 
preemption clause does not prevent the enforcement of private agreements that airlines enter into 
voluntarily). 
 53 Mitchell, 858 F. Supp. 2d at 155, 157–58. 
 54 Id. at 158. 
 55 Brown II, 720 F.3d at 63. 
 56 Id. at 65. 
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the substantive relevance of the claim and asks whether the claim is suffi-
ciently related to a price, route, or service of an air carrier.57 
Finding affirmative answers to both the substantive and procedural 
prongs, the First Circuit held that the ADA preempted the skycaps’ claims.58 
Under the procedural first prong, the court focused on the phrase “other 
provision” in the ADA’s preemption clause and determined that common 
law claims have the force and effect of law.59 The court reasoned that, simi-
lar to positive law, common law could force the airline industry to alter its 
business practices.60 Regarding the substantive second prong, the court de-
termined that the baggage fees were related to a price, route, or service.61 
The court reaffirmed DiFiore II’s finding that curbside checking of baggage 
is itself part of the “service” referred to in the ADA’s preemption clause.62 
The court also followed DiFiore II in holding that an airline’s “price” in-
cludes charges for such ancillary services in addition to the flight itself.63 
II. CAUGHT IN THE JETWASH: THE ADA’S PREEMPTIVE SCOPE 
The 1995 Supreme Court decision in American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens 
left courts in disagreement regarding how to properly balance the broad 
scope of the ADA preemption clause with the Wolens exception and the re-
tained FAA savings clause.64 Courts disagreed as to whether the Wolens ex-
ception pertained simply to private contract enforcement or to all common 
law claims too tenuous to impact airline prices.65 Central to this disagree-
ment were the courts’ differing definitions of “services” and “other provi-
                                                                                                                           
 57 Id. The two prongs are premised on the text of the ADA preemption provision. See 49 
U.S.C. § 41713(b) (2006). 
 58 Brown II, 720 F.3d at 71. 
 59 See 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b); Brown II, 720 F.3d at 64–65. 
 60 Brown II, 720 F.3d at 65. 
 61 See id. at 64. 
 62 Id.; see 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b); DiFiore II, 646 F.3d at 87. 
 63 Brown II, 720 F.3d at 64; see 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b); DiFiore II, 646 F.3d at 87. 
 64 See Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 222, 232–33 (1995); DiFiore II, 646 F.3d 
81, 86 (1st Cir. 2011) (noting that Morales and Wolens provide no easily applied test); Delta Air 
Lines, Inc. v. Black, 116 S.W.3d 745, 750 (Tex. 2003) (noting that, in the wake of Wolens, courts 
have struggled to determine when the ADA preempts state law claims). 
 65 Compare Taj Mahal Travel, Inc. v. Delta Airlines Inc., 164 F.3d 186, 191 (3d Cir. 1998) 
(reasoning that Wolens shows that Morales is not open ended), with Charas v. Trans World Air-
lines, Inc., 160 F.3d 1259, 1264 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that Wolens held that the ADA did not 
preempt common law contract claims and implicitly suggested that private tort claims also avoid 
preemption), and Deerskin Trading Post, Inc. v. United Postal Serv. of Am., 972 F. Supp. 665, 670 
(N.D. Ga. 1997) (holding that Wolens instructs courts to read the ADA preemption broadly, thus 
preempting state tort law related to an airline’s service). The First Circuit interprets the Wolens 
exception as limited to the enforcement of an airlines’ self-imposed undertakings. See Buck v. Am. 
Airlines, Inc., 476 F.3d 29, 37 (1st Cir. 2007). 
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sions” in the ADA.66 As a result, unanswered questions remain, and federal 
court decisions continue to yield inconsistent results.67 Section A discusses 
the various modes of analysis developed by federal appeals courts.68 Sec-
tion B then examines how these various tests have created further confu-
sion.69 
A. Divergent Approaches to ADA Preemption 
Prior to the First Circuit’s decision in Brown II, federal appeals courts 
analyzing the ADA preemption issue followed two modes of analysis.70 The 
first approach, adopted by the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Sev-
enth Circuits, focuses on the economic impact of the state action.71 This 
approach interprets “services” broadly and finds that the ADA preempts 
state regulations and common law that have a significant economic impact 
upon air carriers.72 Only state actions without potential economic impact on 
                                                                                                                           
 66 Compare Branche v. Airtran Airways, Inc., 342 F.3d 1248, 1257 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding 
that a broader reading of “services” is a preferable reading of the preemption clause), with Charas, 
160 F.3d at 1261 (defining “services” as generally referring to point-to-point transport of passen-
gers), and Hodges v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 44 F.3d 334, 336 (5th Cir. 1995) (concluding “services” 
to include terms such as ticketing, boarding procedures, provision of food and drink, and baggage 
handling, in addition to the transportation itself). Compare United Airlines, Inc. v. Mesa Airlines, 
Inc., 219 F.3d. 604, 607 (7th Cir. 2000) (concluding that state common law claims fall under the 
“other provision” phrase of the ADA preemption clause), with Spinrad v. Comair, Inc., 825 F. 
Supp. 2d 397, 412 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (finding that Congress did not intend “other provision” to 
encompass the common law). 
 67 See Taj Mahal Travel, 164 F.3d at 192 (explaining that federal courts have struggled with 
the relationship between the ADA and common law claims); see also Matthew J. Kelly, Comment, 
Federal Preemption by the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978: How Do State Tort Claims Fare?, 49 
CATH. U. L. REV. 873, 901–02 (2000) (concluding that until the Supreme Court defines crucial 
terms of the ADA preemption clause, courts will continue to yield inconsistent results); Frenette, 
supra note 20, at 198 (arguing that federal courts interpret the preemption provision to accommo-
date the case at hand). 
 68 See infra notes 70–77 and accompanying text. 
 69 See infra notes 78–83 and accompanying text. 
 70 Compare Mesa Airlines, 219 F.3d at 609 (holding that a claim is preempted if the applica-
tion would have a significant impact on an airline’s rates or services), with Taj Mahal Travel, 164 
F.3d at 192 (holding that a state law is preempted by the ADA only if it frustrates congressional in-
tent or imposes a utility-like regulation). 
 71 See Onoh v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 613 F.3d 596, 600 (5th Cir. 2010); Travel All Over the 
World, Inc. v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 73 F.3d 1423, 1432 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 72 Onoh, 613 F.3d at 599, 600 (holding “service” to include items such as ticketing, boarding 
procedures, provision of food and drink, and baggage handling); Travel All Over the World, 73 
F.3d at 1432 (adopting the Fifth Circuit’s broad definition of “services,” and holding that services 
include an airline’s refusal to transport those who booked their tickets through a travel agency); 
see 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b) (2006). Under this approach, the ADA can preempt state rules and 
common law even if the rules do not expressly refer to air carriers’ rates, routes, and services. See 
Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 388 (1992). 
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airlines survive preemption.73 Courts following this approach view the 
Wolens exception to only apply to self-imposed obligations that do not en-
large state law.74 
The second approach, adopted by the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 
Third and Ninth Circuits, focuses primarily on whether the alleged claim 
frustrates the congressional intent of economic deregulation of the airline 
industry.75 Under this approach, the term “services” is interpreted narrowly, 
applying only to actions that expressly involve transportation or schedul-
ing.76 Additionally, courts following this approach explain that the Wolens 
exception applies to any common law claim that does not adversely impact 
the forces of competition within the airline industry.77 
B. Inconsistency Within the Divergent Approaches 
Although these approaches appear relatively similar, their application 
has created inconsistent results with regard to ADA preemption.78 Applying 
the first approach, the Northern District of Illinois found an unjust enrich-
ment claim preempted in the 2013 case Lagen v. United Continental Hold-
ings, Inc. because the claim would have a significant economic effect on 
                                                                                                                           
 73 See Mesa Airlines, 219 F.3d at 609. The Fifth Circuit adopted this test in the 2010 case 
Onoh v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., rejecting the plaintiff passenger’s breach of contract and tort claims 
as preempted by the ADA. 613 F.3d at 600. The Seventh Circuit applied this test in the 1996 case 
Travel All Over the World, Inc. v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, rejecting a travel agency’s breach of 
contract and tortious interference claims against a defendant airline. See 73 F.3d at 1432. 
 74 Onoh 613 F.3d at 600; Travel All Over the World, 73 F.3d at 1434. For example, the ADA 
does not preempt a breach of contract claim based on an airline’s failure to satisfy its self-imposed 
obligation to provide plaintiff passengers with ground transportation to a connecting flight. See 
Seals v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 924 F. Supp. 854, 859 (E.D. Tenn. 1996). 
 75 Taj Mahal Travel, 164 F.3d at 195; Charas, 160 F.3d at 1265–66. 
 76 Taj Mahal Travel, 164 F.3d at 195; Charas, 160 F.3d at 1265–66; see 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b); 
Murphy supra note 10, at 1206–07 (arguing that the Ninth and Third Circuits narrowly define 
“services”). In 1998, the Ninth Circuit held in Charas v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., that the ADA 
does not preempt common law tort claims that do not frustrate Congress’s intent to prevent the eco-
nomic regulation of airlines. 160 F.3d at 1261. In the same year, the Third Circuit held in Taj Mahal 
Travel, Inc. v. Delta Airlines, Inc., that the ADA did not preempt common law defamation claims 
against an airline, as the claims did not frustrate congressional intent or regulate the airlines. 164 F.3d 
at 195. 
 77 See Ginsberg v. Nw., Inc., 695 F.3d 873, 881 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2387 
(2013). These courts have also interpreted the Wolens exception to support holding that common 
law tort claims are not preempted by the ADA. See Taj Mahal Travel, 164 F.3d at 195. 
 78 Compare Ginsberg, 695 F.3d at 878–79 (applying the second approach and holding that the 
ADA did not preempt common law claims of implied breach of covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing), and Thompson v. US Airways, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 468, 478 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (applying 
the second approach and holding that the ADA did not preempt skycaps’ claim for unjust enrich-
ment), with Lagen v. United Cont’l Holdings, Inc., 920 F. Supp. 2d 912, 918 (N.D. Ill. 2013) (ap-
plying the first approach and holding that the ADA preempted the plaintiff’s claims of unjust en-
richment and breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing). 
2014] Brown Clarifies the Preemptive Scope of the Airline Deregulation Act 25 
airline services.79 Conversely, courts following the second approach have 
found that the ADA does not preempt similar claims of tortious interference, 
unjust enrichment, and good faith and fair dealing, as these claims do not 
endanger the deregulation of the airline industry.80 For example, in 2012, 
the Ninth Circuit held in Ginsberg v. Northwest, Inc. that the ADA did not 
preempt a frequent flyer program member’s claims of implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing.81 The court determined that Congress intended 
to only preempt state laws with a direct effect on airline pricing.82 Conse-
quently, these two approaches provide courts with an elusive test that re-
quires a time consuming case-by-case analysis to determine whether a given 
state law cause of action is preempted.83 
III. CLEAR SKIES AHEAD: THE TWO-PRONGED APPROACH ARTICULATED IN 
BROWN II FURTHERS AIRLINE DEREGULATION POLICY 
The two-pronged analysis of the ADA preemption provision articulat-
ed in Brown II best effectuates the deregulatory policies underlying the 
ADA.84 In doing so, the two-pronged approach faithfully applies Supreme 
Court precedent, provides greater clarity regarding the ADA’s preemptive 
scope, and assists the airline industry in implementing new programs with-
                                                                                                                           
 79 See 920 F. Supp. 2d at 918; see also Deerskin, 972 F. Supp. at 669 (holding that the ADA 
preempted the plaintiff’s claim of unjust enrichment because imposing such an obligation would 
create a state-imposed price or pricing practice). 
 80 See Ginsberg, 695 F.3d at 878–79; Thompson, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 478. 
 81 695 F.3d at 878–79. 
 82 Id. at 877, 880. In the 2010 U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania case 
Thompson v. US Airways, Inc., the court similarly held that the ADA did not preempt the skycaps’ 
claims of tortious interference and unjust enrichment against an airline. See 717 F. Supp. 2d at 
478. 
 83 See Travel All Over the World, 73 F.3d at 1432 (explaining that preemption of common law 
requires a case-by-case analysis); Spinrad, 825 F. Supp. 2d at 407 (finding that limited analysis 
has left courts unclear as to whether the ADA preemption provision applies to common law negli-
gence claims); see also Frenette, supra note 20, at 198 (arguing that federal courts interpret the 
preemption provision to accommodate the case at hand). 
 84 Compare Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 378 (1992) (noting that in 
passing the ADA, Congress determined that maximum reliance on competitive market forces 
would best further efficiency, innovation, and low prices of air transportation services), and Abdu-
Brisson v. Delta Airlines Inc., 128 F.3d 77, 85 (2d Cir. 1997) (expressing that a more bright line 
approach to ADA preemption analysis would be beneficial to the courts in developing consistent 
findings), with Brown II, 720 F.3d 60, 66 (1st. Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 82 U.S.L.W. 3242 
(U.S. Oct. 7, 2013) (No. 13-444) (clarifying that a broad scope of common law claims are subject 
to ADA preemption, mitigating potential back-door state regulation). See also infra notes 94–96 
and accompanying text (explaining why the two-pronged test furthers the deregulatory policies of 
the ADA). 
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out fear of back-door state regulations.85 As long as both prongs of the 
Brown II test are applied faithfully, the airline industry is protected from 
back-door state regulation while states retain the ability to enforce the air-
lines’ self-imposed private agreements.86 Consequently, this standard will 
give the airline industry the confidence to implement innovative policies 
nationwide without fear of varying degrees of liability arising from com-
mon law claims.87 
The two-pronged test articulated by the First Circuit encompasses 
common law claims as having the force and effect of law, and thus is 
aligned with recent Supreme Court jurisprudence.88 The Supreme Court 
repeatedly interpreted the ADA preemption provision broadly, and the First 
Circuit’s expansive definition of the ADA phrase “other provision” is faith-
ful to this broad interpretation.89 Moreover, the Court-created Woolens ex-
ception was not designed to save all common law claims from the ADA 
                                                                                                                           
 85 See Brown II, 720 F.3d at 62–66 (clarifying the scope of ADA preemption and observing 
that the Supreme Court and the First Circuit consistently give a wide interpretive sweep to ADA 
preemption); see also Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 232 n.8 (1995) (noting that 
principles of contract law may be preempted if they seek to effectuate state policies); Morales, 504 
U.S. at 386 (noting that it would be irrational to create a preemption loophole allowing states to 
impair a federal scheme through a particularized application of a general statute); Frenette, supra 
note 20, at 201 (arguing that further clarity was needed in ADA preemption analysis); infra notes 
85–93 and accompanying text (explaining further how Brown II aligns with Supreme Court juris-
prudence). 
 86 See Wolens, 513 U.S. at 231 (holding that the ADA preemption clause prevents states from 
imposing their own substantive standards with respect to airline rates, routes, or services); Mo-
rales, 504 U.S. at 386 (noting that it would be irrational to create a preemption loophole to a com-
prehensive federal deregulatory scheme); Brown II, 720 F.3d at 62 (concluding that the enforce-
ment of common law claims can create as much inconsistency as state laws, and therefore inter-
preting ADA preemption broadly to include certain common law claims, save those premised on 
an airline’s self-imposed undertakings). 
 87 Compare Taj Mahal Travel, Inc. v. Delta Airlines Inc., 164 F.3d 186, 194 (3d Cir. 1998) 
(indicating that little guidance regarding ADA preemption caused confusion among the courts and 
uncertainty for airline industries), and Charas v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 160 F.3d 1259, 1265 
(9th Cir. 1998) (indicating that common law claims may escape ADA preemption), with Brown II, 
720 F.3d at 66 (clarifying that all common law claims related to an airline’s price, route, or service 
will be subject to ADA preemption). See also DiFiore II, 646 F.3d 81, 88 (1st Cir. 2011) (noting 
that allowing such claims would enable juries to create their own ad hoc compliance schemes that 
would impact airline pricing and service policies). 
 88 See Brown II, 720 F.3d at 62; see also, e.g., Wolens, 513 U.S. at 250 n.8 (clarifying that 
some state law principles of contract law might be preempted); Am. Truck Ass’ns v. City of Los 
Angeles, 133 S. Ct. 2096, 2098 (2013) (concluding that terms of private agreement were preempt-
ed by the FAAAA because terms have the force and effect of law); Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 522 
U.S. 312, 324–25 (2008) (holding that common law claims are preempted even though not ex-
pressly named in preemption clause); Morales, 504 U.S. at 386 (holding that the preemption 
clause has an expansive scope and preempts state actions that relate to airline rates, routes, or 
services—or those that have a forbidden economic impact on the airline industry). 
 89 See 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b) (2006); supra note 88 (collecting cases). 
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preemption clause, but merely to prevent airlines from using the ADA as 
shelter against actions that attempt to enforce their private agreements.90 
Accordingly, unjust enrichment and tortious interference claims should not 
fall under the Wolens exception as these claims involve obligations created 
by law that is external to a private agreement.91 Thus, the ADA must 
preempt such common law claims, as these claims have the effect of posi-
tive state laws.92 The two-pronged test enables this preemption as it refrains 
from engaging in a time-consuming analysis as to whether state enforce-
ment of the claim is more aptly described as tenuous or significant.93 
In addition, by interpreting the ADA to preempt such common law 
claims, the two-pronged test protects the airline industry from inconsistent 
back-door state regulations.94 The First Circuit’s broad definition of “ser-
vice” in the ADA preemption provision enables consistent airline policies 
driven primarily by market forces.95 Reliance on competitive market forces 
is ideal, as these policies have been found to best further the efficiency and 
innovation of airline services.96  
                                                                                                                           
 90 See Wolens, 513 U.S. at 228 (holding that the ADA preemption clause does not shelter 
airlines from claims based solely on a violation of self-imposed obligations); Buck v. Am. Air-
lines, Inc., 476 F.3d 29, 37 (1st Cir. 2007) (holding that the Wolens exception is limited to only 
self-imposed undertakings). Nevertheless, the Court cautioned that some principles of contract law 
might be preempted to the extent they seek to effectuate public policies. See Wolens, 513 U.S. at 233 
n.8. But see Ginsberg v. Nw., Inc., 695 F.3d 873, 878–79 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 
2387 (2013) (holding that nothing in the ADA’s language or history suggests Congress intended to 
displace common law contract claims that only indirectly affected carriers). 
 91 See Lagen v. United Cont’l Holdings Inc., 920 F. Supp. 2d 912, 918 (N.D. Ill. 2013) (find-
ing that an unjust enrichment claim is preempted by ADA); see also Jean Braucher, Contract Ver-
sus Contractarianism: The Regulatory Role of Contract Law, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 697, 699 
(1990) (arguing that social norms should not be used to enforce contracts). 
 92 See Morales, 504 U.S. at 386; Brown II, 720 F.3d at 62; see also Matthew Azoulay, Note, 
American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens: The Supreme Court’s Reregulation of the Airline Industry, 5 
WIDENER J. PUB. L. 405, 411 (1996) (arguing that claims based on state common law have the 
same potential to undermine the principal goals of the ADA). 
 93 See Brown II, 720 F.3d at 62 (clarifying that all common law claims that are related to an 
airline’s price route or service, save those premised on an airline’s self-imposed undertakings, are 
preempted); cf. Travel All Over the World, Inc. v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 73 F.3d 1423, 1432 
(7th Cir. 1996) (explaining that preemption of common law previously required a case-by-case 
analysis); Spinrad v. Comair, Inc., 825 F. Supp. 2d 397, 407 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (finding that previ-
ous ADA analyses have left courts unclear as to which common law claims are preempted); Fre-
nette, supra note 20, at 198 (arguing that federal courts interpret the preemption provision to ac-
commodate the case at hand). 
 94 See Brown II, 720 F.3d at 62 (noting that courts adjudicating common law claims can create 
as much uncertainty and inconsistency as can state laws or regulations); see also Morales, 504 
U.S. at 386 (noting that it would be irrational to create a preemption loophole allowing states to 
impair a federal scheme through application of a general statute). 
 95 See 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b) (2006); Brown II, 720 F.3d at 62. 
 96 See Morales, 504 U.S. at 378–79 (expressing that Congress included the ADA preemption 
provision to ensure that states do not replace federal deregulation with regulation of their own). 
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Given that the two-pronged approach achieves much-needed clarity 
regarding the ADA and consistency for the airline industry, other courts 
should adopt this test.97 A uniform treatment of state common law and posi-
tive law will allow courts to focus the analysis on an action’s impact on the 
airline industry.98 Moreover, this two-pronged test can be reconciled with 
federal appeals courts that narrowly interpret “services” in the ADA 
preemption provision.99 The Ninth Circuit’s narrow interpretation of “ser-
vices” aligns with the two-pronged test, as it has held the point-to-point 
transportation of cargo to fall within the ADA’s expansive preemption pro-
vision.100 Therefore, under the two-pronged analysis, courts can apply a 
uniform mode of analysis that can be reconciled with prior jurisprudence 
and may yield more consistent results.101 
CONCLUSION 
Since the Supreme Court’s 1995 decision in American Airlines, Inc., v. 
Wolens, federal appeals courts have struggled to resolve the preemptive 
scope of Airline Deregulation Act. In Brown v. United Airlines, Inc., the 
                                                                                                                           
 97 See Brown II, 720 F.3d at 62 (providing clarity to ADA preemption jurisprudence); Travel 
All Over the World, 73 F.3d at 1432 (explaining that ADA preemption rulings have had a pattern of 
inconsistency); see also Frenette, supra note 20, at 198 (arguing that courts would benefit from 
further clarity in ADA preemption analysis). 
 98 See Murphy, supra note 10, at 1206–17 (arguing that analyses adopting a broad definition 
of services and that focus on a state law’s connection to air carriers would provide greater clarity).  
 99 See 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b); Brown II, 720 F.3d at 62; see also, e.g., Branche v. Airtran Air-
ways, Inc., 342 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that “services” should be read broadly); Char-
as, 160 F.3d at 1261 (defining “services” as generally referring to point-to-point transport of pas-
sengers); Hodges v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 44 F.3d 334, 336 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (holding “ser-
vices” to include boarding procedures and baggage handling). Accordingly, the two-pronged ap-
proach would have yielded the same result as in Ginsberg, even though the Ginsberg court applied 
a narrow definition of “services.” See Brown II, 720 F.3d at 62–66; Ginsberg, 695 F.3d at 880–81 
(finding that although common law contract claims can be preempted by the ADA, an implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing did not sufficiently relate to the airline price, route, or 
service). 
 100 Compare Charas, 160 F.3d at 1265 (defining services narrowly as generally referring to 
point-to-point transportation), with Brown II, 720 F.3d at 64 (adopting the two-pronged approach 
and classifying the curbside checking of baggage as itself part of the “service” referred to in the 
ADA’s preemption), and DiFiore II, 646 F.3d at 87, 88 (indicating that point-to-point transporta-
tion includes arranging for the transportation of baggage). But see Duncan v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 
208 F.3d 1112, 1114–15 (9th Cir. 2000) (handling of luggage falls outside term “services”). 
 101 See Brown II, 720 F.3d at 62–66 (clarifying the scope of ADA preemption and observing 
that the Supreme Court consistently gives a wide interpretive sweep to ADA preemption); see also 
Wolens, 513 U.S. at 232 n.8 (noting that principles of contract law may be preempted if they seek 
to effectuate state policies); Morales, 504 U.S. at 386 (noting that it would be irrational to create a 
preemption loophole allowing states to impair a federal scheme through a particularized applica-
tion of a general statute); Frenette, supra note 20, at 201 (arguing that further clarity would benefit 
courts). 
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First Circuit articulated a two-pronged analysis that provides airlines and 
courts with much needed clarity as to the ADA’s preemptive scope. The 
First Circuit’s approach is better aligned with the manifest purpose of air-
line deregulation, as it prevents the Wolens exception from becoming an 
avenue for state regulation of the airline industry. Although this institutional 
limitation may shield the airline industry from certain litigation, the First 
Circuit’s decision preserves Congress’s manifest purpose when enacting the 
ADA. Because it provides clarity to the courts and protects the airline in-
dustry and the American public from inconsistent regulation and pricing, 
other courts should adopt the two-pronged analysis articulated in Brown. 
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